\Cramer Fire Salmon River Fire History 2013 Closed Caption Final
In 2003, the Cramer Fire over ran and killed 2 firefighters on the Salmon-Challis National
Forest.
Less than 10 years later, in 2012, the Mustang Fire burned 340,000 acres covering the same
location.
It is important to understand the fire behavior history of the area you fight fire in.
If have been or have been involved in wildland firefighting, chances are going to experience
fire assignments in the Salmon River Breaks.
(00:14-2:08) The fires that have burned in this country are part of wildland firefighter
lore, including 2 fatality fires, as well as several hundred firefighter entrapments
and shelter deployments.
Many of these have been used in the past as training case studies, such as the Ship Island
Fire, and Mortar Creek Fire back in 1979, the Butte Fire, and Lake Mountain Fire in
1985, the Clear Creek Fire in 2000, and the Salt Fire in 2011.
This country is characterized by deep river canyons, with very steep slopes frequently
bisected by rugged ridges.
The terrain has significant effect on weather patterns.
Diurnal winds are common; cooler air sinks into the canyons at night, displacing the
warmer air, creating thermal belts.
These inversions allow mid-slope fires to burn all night long, spreading downhill and
down valley with the winds, and ember rollout, often hooking containment lines.
The steep terrain offers few opportunities for roads and helispots.
The sheer amount of energy that crews expend to hike into a fire can leave them spent.
Often, the aerial delivery of firefighters and supplies is the only logical method.
Terrain also forces base camps and helibases to be located far from their fires.
While it is difficult to get firefighters to the fires, it is even more important to
remember that it is difficult to get them out.
(2:09-6:26) On the Salmon-Challis National Forest in the last thirty-three years, we
have had two hundred and eight firefighter entrapments.
Thatís a big deal.
Weíve been blessed that weíve only had three fatalities as a result of burnovers.
Those people are not stupid, somethingís happening with that fire behavior, that for
some reason, theyíre not anticipating.
And then it happens, and they get caught.
The Salmon River breaks country, had a historical fire regime, that the majority of the landscape
was a frequent, low severity fire regime.
We have grasses, we have elk sedge, we have pine grass, we have fuels that tend to dry
out in July, and August, and are available to burn.
The historic fire regime also, as the current fire regime has, a lot of natural ignitions,
so we get a lot of lightning.
As the storm cells track from West to East across Central Idaho, they get into that river
corridor, and as those storm cells hit that high elevation mountain range, they tend to
stall out, and they just throw down lots of lightning.
Itís an enormous pattern, and when you see it on a map, itís just a concentration of
ignitions.
Not just strikes, but ignitions.
And these fires would burn a long way up the mountain, if not all the way up to the top
of mountain, maybe even in a day.
But they were cool, what we would call cool fire, a low severity fire leaving most of
the over story alive.
The large trees generally were not killed, but the seedling and saplings were thinned
out, and as a result of excluding fire, which occurred the beginning of the 1900ís, these
little tree seedlings have grown in, and they have essentially created a stair step, a ladder
fuels.
Lodgepole grows in under the Doug Fir, and the Doug Fir grow in under the Ponderosa,
they just take advantage of the absence of fire, and we now have a changed fire regime.
We have a vertical fuel profile that exists now, that allows a surface fire to spread
from the lower limbs of a little tree, to the limbs of a medium sized tree, to the limbs
of an overstory canopy.
It sets the stage for crown fire or extreme fire behavior.
These fires not only burn hot, but they move very fast.
We see runs of fifteen miles a day, twelve miles a day, significant, long runs, of high
severity fire.
Iím not sure we fully understand all of how the pieces fit together.
Why is it on some days when you have about the same wind, the same Haines Index, the
same relative humidity, that fire sits there, and pretty much does nothing?
Just sits there and cooks, no great advancement, it doesnít even hardly pull a column together,
and the next day you think itís almost the same situation, and that thing blows up, and
just chunked out 20,000 acres, and it chunked out 20,000 acres in one afternoon.
So I think that there are some things that we line up on, fire weather wise, and then
we just need that wind to get above maybe ten miles an hour, or we just need that relative
humidity to get just below fifteen percent, and I think weíre learning about those things,
and weíre learning how to apply them, but sometimes I think thereís something else
going on, or a combination of those things that go on, that donít allow us to say, ìtoday
at two oíclock this is the momentî.
Thereís something else in there, and it lulls us, it tends to lull us into going ìyou know
Iíve been working this fire for three days, and the weather forecast is identical.
Itís not doing anything, my safety zone now is maybe a half a mile away, where before
it was a quarter of a mile, but weíre chinking this line in, I donít have any hard black,
but Iím going be okayî.
And then all of a sudden, whatever lines up lines up and that thing blows up.
(6:27-11:37) The Salmon River breaks have demonstrated time and time again, that if
you deploy resources without the understanding of what that fire history, and what the extreme
fire behavior is, and what to expect from extreme fire behavior, that you will put,
and will continue to put firefighters at risk.
Looking at the fire history maps, there are some patterns.
And one of those patterns is that winds blow predominantly from the southwest, and especially
pre-frontal and strong winds associated with frontal passages, so a lot of your fires will,
and have shown, strong, extended runs to the northeast.
The other part to that is, that almost always in the Salmon River Breaks, the west side
of the fire, or the west flank, is your easy catch.
Itís the one the wind blows most from.
During the summer you might experience on an average every 7 to 10 days, a frontal passage.
Those should be expected.
If you have gone 3, 5, 6, 7 days without a wind event, your probability of one occurring
within the next few days, is quite high.
In order to describe this most extreme fire behavior and fire behavior runs, Iíd probably
best describe it on the Butte Fire.
They asked me to go up, I was the Air Ops Branch Director, and keep an eye on the fire,
because it was starting to build, and look like it was going to make a run.
And, so by the time we flew from the helibase out to the head of the fire, it was making
a major run.
Flame lengths that were just unimaginable, and approaching the fire line, where all of
the firefighters were, we could see the small little glows of fusees that had been lit along
the fire line, and they were spread out along the fire line, looking to burn out, and try
and hold the fire line.
Looking back down the hill at what was coming at them, it was just a futile effort.
The smoke column itself actually ignited, and caused a huge gaseous ball to roll up
the hillside, it moved 4 miles in minutes.
We flew over, and had contacted one or two of the Division Supís, and explained that
they were about to be overrun, and to move to the safety zones.
One minute after that, we tried to make another circle around, and come back in, and see if
people had gotten to the safety zone, and the fire had overran all of them.
And it was probably the most gut-wrenching, most awful feeling Iíve ever experienced
in my life, and we got a call that reported that the fire had overrun the line, and the
IC asked what the potential was for serious injury or fatality, and thatís a very tough
decision, and a very tough thing to answer.
So I turned to Glenn Johnston, and looked at him and he, uh, he just shook his head
and said, ìI donít think they made itî.
I looked at the pilot and the pilotÖall, everyone on board the ship confirmed that
we probably had a lot of major fatalities, and serious injuries.
So Iíll never forget my response, I thought for a minute or two before I answered, and
my answer was, ìIím not optimisticî.
That situation, and that horror of the moment that existed that we could have easily had
73 fatalities, or more, in that situation.
Fortunately we had done the right thing in terms of putting in the safety zones, and
even though they were somewhat criticized in terms of not being big enough, they were,
I think, the sole reason that that many people survived.
If you look at the final fire size, the fire really didnít get that much larger than what
the burnover occurred, it just burned another mile or two beyond the ridgeline, and petered
out when the wind stopped blowing.
We could have easily picked it up then and not put all those folks at risk, so yeah,
you look back in time and those are the memories, those are the snapshots in time that affect
you the rest of your life in terms of what your tactics, strategies, and what youíre
willing to do and not do.
(11:40-14:22) The Cramer Fire started July 19, 2003 from a lightning strike.
It was detected the next day by Long Tom Lookout at 1630.
20 minutes later, a McCall, Idaho smokejumper aircraft was diverted from another mission,
but was unable to put smokejumpers on the fire because of high winds.
Jumper 41 estimated the fire at 3 acres, burning in light fuels on a 60% to 70% slope, with
a high spread potential.
By 1800, air attack, 2 BLM engines, and the Moyer Type 3 light helicopter and crew are
dispatched to the fire.
Moyer crewmember Matt Schaddle, is the assigned IC Type 4.
As I remember fire behavior that year, on the Salmon-Challis National Forest was just
picking up.
We were starting to get some significant initial attack fires, conditions that were similar
to those that we saw in 2000 when we had the big Clear Creek fire on forest, and really
stuck out in the minds of those of us that had been around.
Anytime I would get a call to the Salmon River Breaks at that point in the evening, that
time of year, you know youíre going to be getting some significant fire growth.
Youíre going to be experiencing quite a bit of roll out.
Steep, nasty, rugged country, youíre going to be dealing with thermal belts more than
likely.
And, itís one of those, you just kind of, at least for me, you just kind of cringe.
By 2000, Moyer helitack and the 2 engines are at Cove Creek Helibase.
Matt Schaddle, and his IC 4 trainee recon the fire in the Moyer helicopter.
At the time we were doing our initial recon, just from the size of the fire, the resources
we knew we had inbound, we knew we werenít going to be able to catch the fire that night,
we immediately ordered up a Type 3 IC before we even hit the ground at H-1.
So our plan, from our recon, was to try and secure that western most flank of the fire,
to be able to give the incoming Type 3 IC something to work with the next day.
They are dropped off at H-1; the IC 4 trainee stays at the helispot to brief the 5 engine
crewmembers as they arrive.
Shaddle scouts the west flank.
You always have that ìthings look different from the air.î Well, itís really common
up there just because you overestimate how easily youíre going to be able to move around.
With dark setting in, I cliffed out a couple of times, we were getting significant rollout
on the fire throughout the night.
Youíd hear a rock, tree, log whatever it might be, break loose, youíd kind of start
counting, itíd be 20 to 30 seconds before something would stop rolling out.
It took me from 20:00, until roughly 23:00, to be able to reach the top portion of the
fire.
Just the sheer nastiness of the terrain, we decided not to engage the fire at that time.
(14:23-29:46) The next morning, the fire has grown to 35 to 45 acres, and is turned over
to a Type 3 IC.
Midday, a Type 2 contract handcrew arrives at Cove Creek helibase, and is flown up to
H-1.
Due to weight limitations and distance, it takes over 3 hours until the entire crew is
on the fire.
The crew puts in line from H-1 towards the east, but it is forced to retreat in the late
afternoon as the winds pick up, pushing the fire east over the ridge into Cramer Creek.
They try to hold the line above H-1, but erratic winds blow the fire across their line.
The IC removes the crew from the fire.
Some fly off H-1, but most hike down to the Salmon River road and are picked up.
At 1830, the fire creeps over the west ridge, and into Cache Bar drainage.
In discussions with the Forest Supervisors office, the IC is optimistic they can catch
the fire the next day if he can have 2 medium helicopters, and personnel for logistics,
and operations support.
He is told the Type 2 helicopters are committed, and to use one of the helitack crewmembers
as a Strike Team Leader to supervise the crews.
After flying the fire, the IC gives a 0900 briefing at the Cove Creek helibase.
Each day the weather is getting progressively warmer and drier; 90 degree temps, and RHís
in the low teens.
The zone forecast says that a weak, short wave disturbance could move through the area
bringing northwest winds 5 to 15 mile per hour.
He tells the crews to expect stronger winds in the afternoon, like the previous days.
Resources for the day include: 4 Type 2 crews, and the Moyer and Indianola Type 3 helicopters
and their helitack crews.
The Strike Team Leader will be running ground operations, while the IC has to stay at Cove
Creek to run logistics and other Opís.
The strategy for the day is to fly 3 crews into H-1, use 2 of the crews to secure the
fires east flank, and 1 crew to anchor the fire to the west; insert 2 rappellerís above
the fire on the west ridge to construct another helispot, H-2, to be used for flying in the
fourth crew to secure the fires west flank.
At 0929, the Indianola helicopter 193 launches with rappellers Jeff Allen, a Class B Faller,
and Shane Heath, a C faller, on their mission to construct H-2.
From the air they are shown their safety zones, which are approximately 200 yards down the
ridge.
Over the site, itís estimated that it will take 1 hour to clear a half dozen large trees
and a number of smaller ones for a Type 3 helicopter helispot.
At 0943 they rappel in, and confirm contact with dispatch.
Central Idaho Dispatch, Allen on Long Tom Helicopter 193, Central Idaho
Copy you loud and clear, thank you This is Allen.
We just rappelled in.
I'm just establishing communications and we're going to begin cutting this helispot.
At 1047, the crew shuttle to H-1 begins, using the 2 light helicopters 166 and 193.
Donny Dance is one of the helitack crewmembers off-loading the crews at H-1.
The fire wasnít doing a whole lot.
It was still in the inversion.
However, below H-1 where myself and a couple other helitack were, there was a small spot
fire caused by some rollout that was putting up some light smoke, but it was starting to
pick up with intensity.
We were able to get some bucket work on it.
We started the crew shuttle, and the idea was to move three crews, so sixty personnel
into there.
Loads for the Type 3 helicopters that were there-youíre averaging two to three people
a load and about 15 minute turnaround time so it was an all-day event.
Around 1220, the IC calls H-1, inquiring about expanding it for medium helicopter use.
Yeah H-1, if you've got time, could you look around that helispot there and see if we can
improve it in any way, for a possible medium?
That's affirm, we'll improve it as much as we can for you.
If that radio conversation was overheard or relayed to Jeff Allen and Shane Heath at H-2,
it is unclear.
What is known is that they ended up cutting and clearing over 20 ìCî sized trees and
many smaller ones.
Throughout the day, when asked for progress updates at H-2, they always replied that they
need more time.
At 1304 Cramer air attack leaves to refuel and have lunch.
Leadplane 41, which is directing retardant drops, takes on some of the air attack duties.
At 1326, Helicopter 166 takes off with the IC for a recon of the fire.
Most of the fire activity is below H-1, with 4 to 6 foot flame lengths interrupting the
crew shuttle for bucket work.
The eastern flank is backing down into Cramer Creek with low intensity, 1 to 2 foot flame
lengths, and still looks catchable.
Over H-2, one of them waves at the helicopter and Jeff Allen reports ìthereís a little
more work to doî.
The IC tells them to call for pickup when finished.
In the Cache Bar drainage, the fire is slowly creeping its way downslope.
The fire is burning in the litter underneath the 3 to 4 foot tall brush.
Cache Bar had a stand replacing fire in 1985, and now consists of rock outcrops, grass,
and shiny leaf ceanothus brush.
Kelly Close was an investigator for the Cramer Fire Accident Investigation Report.
And theyíre so used to seeing all these ceanothus brush fields not carrying fire very well.
They use them as safety zones, the use them tactically as a place they can catch a fire.
Fire hits the brush fields, drops down.
And I think that was in the back of everybodyís minds.
But the weather service was so off with their forecast so often, that the IA crews more
or less just disregarded what they got from the weather service.
They just really didnít think it was anything they could rely on or depend on for their
weather for their fire behavior, and they assessed their expected weather and fire behavior
for the day on what it had done the previous day, and the day before that.
By 1400, the shortwave disturbance moves into Central Idaho.
The winds are reaching H-1.
The smoke was starting to pick up and the fire intensity and it really triggered that
train of thought of, should we be here?
Is this still a safe environment?
What should we do?
And it wasnít just a few minutes later where the wind did pick up to a point where we closed
H-1, due to visibility issues, and then shortly after that we retreated to our safety zones
and watched H-1 burn over.
At 1423, in a radio communication with the forest FMO and dispatch, the IC is concerned
about fire growth on Cramer.
Just wondering if there's any way maybe you can head out to Cove, the helibase, so we
can fly this and take a look.
This thing is kind of going in all different directions.
By 1430, the smoldering fire has reached the bottom of Cache Bar drainage, and has an active
flaming front by 1440.
Starting at 1444, the IC and Strike Team Leader discuss disengaging from the fire.
Yeah due to a bunch of different variables, we're going to hike off this fire, we're regrouping
and we're going to pull off the line right now... and we're going to have to make some
different strategies.
I copy that.
Do you have all three crews with you..?
They're not here at this time, they're pulling back.
And we're all going to group up here at H-1.
And then we're going to hike off.
We just can't do much with the resources we have, and tryin to get them in there in a
timely manner, to catch it first thing in the morning.
Affirm' on that!
I also need to get ahold of Jeff Allen at H-2.
We need to get him out of there too.
Why don't you go ahead and pull them out.
We're fine where we're at.
It's just pretty windy up here... really gusty... and visibility is not that great.
If you guys want to just slowly work your way down to the road...
We'll get some vehicles down there to pick you up... and we'll go get Jeff and Shane
on H-2.
During that radio exchange, the helibase contacted Jeff Allen at H-2, using Lead 41, and Allen
said they needed another 40 to 45 minutes.
At 1454, air attack returns over the fire, and notes the increased fire behavior.
Talking with Lead 41, he learns that the rappellers are going to be picked up from H-2.
Later, due to similar personnel names, they thought the pick-up mission had occurred.
You had Strike Team leader working down at H-1, whose first name was Heath, and you had
Shane Heath working at H-2.
You had Allen Hackett, the IC, and Jeff Allen, working at H-2.
So depending on whether they were using the first name or the last name, Allen or Heath,
who was where?
And they thought Heath and Allen were both down either at H-1, or the helibase.
Then, at 1505, Jeff Allen calls helibase.
Cramer Helibase, H-2 on Long Tom.
This is Helibase, H-2 go ahead.
Yeah bud, we're ready for pick-up.
Alright, we'll send 193 on it's way.
Yeah, send 'em in a hurry bud.
And whatís happening is, we got fire below us.
Weíve got smoke coming right at us.
And we talk about decision gates, I think thatís an important one, because the first
time they requested a helicopter, and there wasnít immediate verification that it was
leaving, just yeah, weíll send 193 on its way.
Ok, send ëem in a hurry, bud.
And thatís 1505, 20 minutes after theyíve just told the helibase it was going to take
them another 45 minutes to finish their job.
So theyíve decided itís time to go, send them in a hurry.
They donít sound panicked, but theyíre definitely making the point that, do it now, donít do
it when itís convenient.
4 minutes later, they havenít heard anything back, so at 1509 they call back to the helibase.
What's the status of 193?
They're still here on the ground.
They're going to be spooling up shortly to come pick you up.
We need them right now.
Helibase, did you copy?
We copy.
We're sending 166 to get you right now.
Thanks.
And the problem with that was both 166 and 193 were both down at the helibase being refueled.
193 was the one that was having itís 30 hour maintenance done.
3 minutes later, 1512, they call back again, because they havenít heard anything.
Whatís the status of the ship?
Yeah Jeff, the helicopter needed some fuel, but it's going to start spooling here right
now...
Any problems right at the moment?
No bud.
We've just got fire down below us and the smoke is coming right at us.
So just make them hurry up.
They're spooling right now.
And if they go down to the safety zone, theyíre going to miss their ride out, because they
were told, the helicopterís coming.
Itís spooling up now, itís going to be off the ground shortly.
So why would they go down there when the helicopterís on its way?
If they go down and hunker in the safety zone, theyíre going to have to walk down the river,
and thatís some pretty nasty ground.
They hang out here another few minutes, they catch their ride.
Life is good.
I do have to think, though, or at least wonder, if they came over this knob, down to where
weíre standing now, which is the first place you can get with a really good view down into
the Cache Bar drainage.
Granted it was smoky, but if it was me, Iíd be curious.
Iíd be wanting to know what the fire was doing, because I had smoke coming at me, Iíd
be wanting to get a better view, and you can easily come down this far and take a look,
and not be too far from H-2.
The fire was traveling roughly about a mile an hour, a mile and a half an hour, and this
would have been a place that I would have tried to gauge the rate of spread.
And if Iím gauging the rate of spread by what itís doing there, and I donít consider
acceleration, I just consider that thatís the rate of spread that itís going to continue
at, then Iím going to figure I have a certain amount of discretionary time before I absolutely
have to be out of here.
I should be concerned about fire below me, but itís a long ways away, it doesnít spread
that fast in shiny leaf ceanothus, and therefore I have this much time.
And in reality they have this much time.
Air attack is back in the area, they later described what they saw at that point as this
sheet of flames across the hillside.
The heavies were burning, big flaming Xís on the hillside, flame lengths in the brush
30 to 50 feet, at the leading edge of the fire.
So this is going on, helicopterís spooling right now, 13 miles away at the Gold Creek
helibase.
Then at 1519, another 7 minutes, they call back to the helibase.
What's the status of 166 ? He should be there shortly.
Copy that.
It had to be loud.
The wind is howling.
The description of the smoke coming up the Cache Bar drainage, was that it was hugging
the ground, it was hugging the slope, the wind was driving it into the slope, and just
following up the ground, peeling over the ridgeline, and then joining the main column
in Cramer Creek.
1520, the helicopter was over H-2, and couldnít land due to the smoke, told them we canít
land.
So, at that point, they said they were taking off on foot.
They didnít say which way they were going, just that they were leaving on foot.
And, really, if you look at time lines of the spread, by about 1520, that was it.
All the doors were closed.
They wouldnít have had time to get around the head here, they couldnít get down to
the safety zone this way.
And without a clear option of bailing over the ridge in the Cramer Creek side, because
that was also blowing up at that time, they really had nowhere to go, except where they
didnít think there was fire coming at them, which is roughly that direction.
Initially, once that fire front got established, and started really moving up the drainage,
it was running right around 1 Ω to 2 miles an hour.
By the time it got æ of the way up the drainage, down at the base of the slope below H-2, theyíre
estimating closer to 4 to 6 miles an hour.
So you get this repetitive, iterative process where youíve got fire intensity pulling fresh
air in at the base, which intensifies the fire, and keeps feeding that, and as this
starts to build and move up the drainage, it kept accelerating, kept accelerating, and
it became almost like a runaway locomotive, barreling up the drainage and blasting over
the ridgeline.
Could I get some... ...support up here right now?
[radio crackle] (30:21-31:47) I grew up here in Salmon, and
went to high school with Jeff, and worked with Jeff for numerous years here on the Salmon-Challis
and so, there was that sense of worry and concern, and youíre hoping everythingís
okay, so itís a delicate situation.
I donít really know how to describe it, but itís not something you ever want to find
yourself in.
Sitting on the mountain you felt like you werenít helping, you wanted to help, you
wanted to do something.
There wasnít you couldnít get anybody on the radio at H-2, and you just wanted to do
something, so what we did was we hiked down, hoping to catch a ride to helibase where we
could actually feel like we were going to contribute, and then from there we found out
later that there had been a fatality fire, and then it just struck us sitting there at
helibase, making the phone calls home just saying, hey, I donít know what youíre gonna
hear.
but Iím safe, donít worry about myself.
It was unnerving.