(cheerful music) (fire crackling)
(star whooshing)
- [Narrator] What you're about to see
are the events that led to four fatalities and two injuries
on the Romero Fire on October 7th, 1971.
(soft music)
The fire started at 15:45 on Romero Canyon
and Bella Vista Road,
and spread up slope to the north.
It had burned 500 acres by 18:00.
The nighttime down canyon winds pushed the fire southeast
into Toro and Oil canyons,
above the communities of Summerland and Carpinteria.
Fire weather observations at 14:00
were temperature, 100 degrees.
Relative humidity, 9%.
Wind, Southwest at eight miles per hour.
10 hour fuel stick, 1%.
Ignition component from the old danger rating system, 99.
Fuels, mixed chaparral over 50 years old.
This is fire behavior on the first afternoon, October 6th.
You're looking Northeast from Summerland.
By 10:00 on October 7th,
the fire had reached the ridge
between Arroyo Paredon and Santa Monica Canyon.
The North, West and South portions of the 3,500-acre fire
were partially contained.
The East flank was completely open,
but was holding with retardant drops.
This is looking into Santa Monica Canyon
with a backing fire on the afternoon of October 7th.
Note the heavy fuel and steep terrain.
This is a view of the entire fire
looking North from Highway 101.
The fire is spreading East,
or toward the right side of the screen.
(soft music)
You're now looking up the ridge, near Santa Monica Canyon.
This ridge is the location for indirect line construction
about to take place.
There were four contract dozers,
each with a US Forest Service dozer boss
assigned to complete the line construction.
The dozer bosses had been dispatched as sector bosses,
but were reassigned as dozer bosses.
The dozers had worked by themselves the night before
and were pulling a double shift.
The newly assigned dozer bosses
had to catch up with the dozers in the afternoon.
The dozer bosses did not have a plan, sheet or any maps.
They were briefed verbally at fire camp.
The plan was to construct indirect line
on the East side of the fire,
up a side ridge to the main Camino Cielo Ridge.
Firing and holding of the completed line
was proposed for the night shift,
California Department Of Forestry hand crews.
However, the hand crew supervisor
decided to wait and see what the winds would do
before committing his crews
to the firing and holding operation.
The fuels were very heavy,
and progress was slow
as these fuels had not burned since 1917.
Of the four contract dozer operators involved,
only one had extensive wildland firefighting experience
and new local weather patterns.
The three other operators had little
if any firefighting experience.
The four dozer bosses were qualified
but were not familiar with local weather patterns.
Communications were not good.
There were only two local radio frequencies
and this fire was the first time
the national cache of handheld radios
had been used on the forest.
The dozer bosses were assigned two radios
for the four dozers.
One radio did not work,
and the second radio quit working late in the afternoon.
The 14:30 weather forecast called for down canyon winds
late in the evening,
with North winds to 15 miles per hour.
A 20:00 update predicted a heavy marine influence
with southerly winds to eight miles per hour.
There were no sundowners predicted for that night.
This graph shows high-growth thermograph readings
for October 10th.
Readings for October 7th, 8th and 9th
were essentially the same.
This indicates how rapidly weather conditions deteriorated
in less than 12 minutes.
Note the abrupt temperature increase
and dropping humidity prior to 20:00.
You're looking East into Santa Monica Canyon.
This shows fire activity at about 21:00,
the night of October 7th.
The dozer operators were working their second shift.
Fatigue, darkness and increasing fire activity
began to worry them.
They decided to return to camp
and work back down their fire line
to its intersection with the Edison power line Road.
At the intersection, the experienced local operator
recommended they take the Edison Road out.
However, the other operators had heard
that the road was heavily overgrown with brush,
and was not a good escape route.
The experienced operator and his dozer boss
thought they had convinced the others to use the Edison Road
and began to lead the way out.
The three other dozers made the decision to go back
up the fire line they had just pushed
to a safety zone on top of the ridge
by a power line tower.
The local experienced operator and his dozer boss
hurried West on Edison Road toward a staging area
with spot fires chasing them.
They arrived safely.
The three dozers that proceeded back up the fire line
found themselves trapped short of their safety zone.
The last dozer in line was caught by the flames first.
The operator jumped off and the dozer rolled back down
to the Edison Road intersection with the fire line.
At this point, the situation was as follows.
One dozer is out of danger,
having taken the Edison Road out.
One dozer is abandoned.
The dozer highest on the ridge,
now has two operators on it.
The second dozer has one operator
and three dozer bosses on it.
The fire is on both sides of the ridge
and the dozers are unable to go forward or backward
because of the flames and heat impact.
Here, you see the fire intensity rapidly increasing
under sundowner conditions.
The time is around 21:30, the night of October 7th.
The fire is about two to three miles away from the camera.
Note a firestorm developing
with flames reaching two to 300 feet in the air
and spotting half a mile ahead of the fire
down in the canyon.
As the camera looks northeasterly,
at the head of Santa Monica Canyon,
you see whirlwinds are developing,
and area ignition is occurring.
The roar at this point was deafening
to observers two miles away.
The firestorm pushes a flame front,
one quarter to one half mile wide
out of Arroyo Paredon Canyon
into Santa Monica Canyon,
and causes a massive whirlwind.
The entrapped dozers are just above the intense flames
hitting the top of the ridge.
The entrapped dozers are now visible on top of the ridge.
You're now looking at the same area
the morning after the entrapment.
(soft music)
Notice the complete consumption of all fuels,
and the second dozer parked directly above a chimney.
The lead dozer was still running
when rescue workers arrived.
The two contract operators survived
by running back and forth around the dozer
using it as a heat barrier to protect themselves.
They were dressed in loose, heavy canvas jackets.
At the second dozer,
the rescue workers found four fatalities.
Two individuals were found under the dozer,
one individual was found behind the blade
and one individual was 15 feet from the dozer.
The dozer operator had tried to dig a hole
for the victims to get into.
The dozer was parked on top of the berm and not running.
You're looking up the ridge
and the area where the dozers were working.
Notice the steepness of the slope and narrow ridge.
This is the abandoned dozer,
where it rolled back down the fire line
to the intersection with the Edison Road escape route.
The fuels in the area are only partially burned,
indicating lower intensity fire behavior.
The intensity of the fire was enough
to cause a power line tower made of metal
to twist and collapse.
(soft music)
You have just seen the events
that occurred on the Romero Fire.
The instructor will now facilitate a discussion
about the use of fire safety guidelines
by the involved personnel,
the strategic and tactical decisions that were made
and the human factors that contributed
to this burnover incident.
(soft music)