(lighthearted music)
- [Narrator] What you're about to see are the events
that led to four fatalities on the Spanish Ranch Fire,
August 15th, 1979.
The fire started in the coastal mountains
of San Louis Obispo County, adjacent to highway 166.
A thoroughfare that runs between the coast
near Santa Maria, and the Southern San Joaquin Valley.
The fire began at 14:02, when a flail mower being operated
by a state road crew, struck a rock.
This fire occurred in an area protected by three agencies.
Among the three agencies, the following equipment
was dispatched on the initial response.
Eight engines, two bulldozers, two type three air tankers,
an air attack supervisor and a battalion chief.
Two engines, one from the U.S forest service,
and one from the Santa Barbara County fire department,
arrived simultaneously at 14:23.
Their initial size up reported the fire at 10 to 15 acres,
with a slow to moderate rate of spread
under the influence of light Northeast winds.
The air attack supervisor arrived five minutes later,
and reported the fire to be 75 to a hundred acres,
under the influence of a Northwest wind.
Fuel loading in the area ranged from three
to four tons per acre.
This is considered to be very light.
The lower slopes were covered with light flashy fuels,
with a sparse overstory of blue Oak.
The middle and upper slopes were covered with Yucca,
light brush and scattered Juniper,
with grass interspersed throughout.
Weather observations at the time of the fire,
as reported from a station 20 miles to the North,
were temperature 84 degrees, relative humidity 26%,
with a 10 hour fuel moisture of 5%.
The fire was burning in mountainous terrain,
with elevations ranging from 1,400 to about 2,500 feet.
The initial attack resources established a strategy
that consisted of utilizing highway 166 as the anchor,
with direct attack on the flanks in a pincer action.
Working toward the head of the fire where air tankers
were establishing a retardant line.
When engine 5379 arrived at 14:40,
the company officer assumed the role of incident commander
and continued this initial strategy.
Battalion chief 5312 arrived at 14:53,
and took over as the incident commander.
- Well, the fire activity, by the time
I got up Carrizo Canyon road, it pretty much laid down.
What smoke it was coming out of the canyons down.
There was pretty much going straight up in the air
and there was no active major runs at that time.
Everything was kind of laying in.
The air tankers had been dropping on it,
and they were making their turnarounds down for reload.
And it looked like the retardant drops were holding
except we weren't able to get people in there,
either in engines or on foot yet to back up the drops.
- [Narrator] His plan was to continue direct attack
on the flanks of the fire,
while constructing an indirect dozer line
on a ridge in front of the fire from Carrizo Canyon road
to the top of Hill 2465.
The air tankers were to continue to hold the head
of the fire, with a retardant line in a drainage
to the South of the main ridge.
While the indirect line construction was taking place.
- We felt with the amount of equipment coming,
and I did ask for more outside of the initial attack forces.
That we could hold the Carrizo Canyon road with engines.
So the strategy then was to try to find a ridge out here
in front of the fire that we could go
from Carrizo Canyon road over to the left or West plank,
and establish a line and either burn it out
or maybe take some direct action
when we got hand crews in here
on the edge of the fire itself.
- [Narrator] The IC discussed this strategy
with the following individuals who had arrived
after the indirect plan had been put into action.
A U.S Forest Service, Fire Prevention Technician
from the local area, a battalion chief from
the Santa Barbara County fire department,
and the local forest service
District Fire Management Officer.
No one offered a dissenting opinion to the plan.
After this briefing took place,
the fire prevention technician expressed concern
to the fire management officer in a one-on-one discussion.
He was concerned that personnel would be too far out
in front of the advance of the fire
with no backup protection.
The district fire management officer did not concur
with this opinion due to the lack of wind
and the mild fire behavior.
Neither of these individuals mentioned this concern
to the IC.
You're now looking West along the ridge,
toward Hill 2465.
Dozer 5348 began constructing line
towards Hill 2465 at 15:30.
At 15:50, engine 5373 arrived at the fire
and the IC assigned the captain and his crew
of three firefighters, to work the indirect line
that was being constructed by the bulldozer.
Their assignment was to walk the dozer line
to the top of Hill 2465, provide protection
to dozer 5348, and to backfire only
in the event that it was necessary for safety.
The captain and his crew were wearing all their
required safety equipment.
In addition, they equip themselves with hand tools,
two back pumps and fuzes.
They began to walk up the line at approximately 15:55.
A second California Department
Of Forestry Battalion Chief arrived at Carrizo Canyon road,
at the same time as engine 5373,
and was given the assignment of being a lookout
for the IC.
After appraising the fire situation,
he was quoted in the investigation report,
as stating that, "The fuel wasn't heavy.
There was no immediate fire threat,
and the wind did not feel unusual."
He was further quoted as stating that he paid
very little attention to the wind,
and that he felt perfectly comfortable
in his normal safety gear.
After donning his gear, he began to follow the dozer line
toward Hill 2465.
At this time, the crew from engine 5373,
was approximately 700 yards ahead of him
up the dozer line.
At 1610, a dozer from Santa Barbara County Fire Department
arrived on the scene and was given the assignment
to follow the first dozer toward Hill 2465,
and to widen the line by one blade width.
These instructions were amended within minutes,
due to an increase in fire activity.
And he was given a new assignment to proceed directly
to dozer 5348's position to assist him.
At 16:15, dozer 5348 was 100 yards short of Hill 2465,
and working toward the top.
At this time, the fire activity was beginning to increase
and the fire had burned through the retardant line
in the drainage South of Hill 2465.
The fire then began a run straight up a chimney,
toward the crest of the ridge.
As this occurred, the air attack supervisor
advised dozer 5348, that he should probably
start back down the dozer line, which he did.
The dozer operator requested air tanker support,
but was told by air attack that none was available.
He then quickly constructed a four blade wide safety Island,
dropped his fire resistant side curtains
and wrapped himself in a fire blanket.
The air attack supervisor did not know that the crew
of engine 5373 was also working on that same ridge.
When the fire moved up slope, it came under the influence
of a 25 to 30 mile per hour upper level West wind.
This changed the fire behavior
from a narrow topographic driven finger of fire,
into a large wind-driven flame front,
moving North and East toward dozer 5348
and the crew of engine 5373.
In a witness statement, the pilot of the air attack plane
said that he never seen a fire move so fast.
At this time, the crew of engine 5373
had reached a point 500 yards East of dozer 5348.
The captain of engine 5373, called the IC and informed him
that he would be unable to reach dozer 5348,
and that he would have to start firing his line.
A few moments later, the captain called
the second battalion chief and told him
the fire had crossed the dozer line.
The captain did attempt to fire out around
his cruise position with fuzes,
in order to create a safety Island,
as shown by these fuzes found on the fire line.
And this fuze slag found in and around the fatality site.
This effort was unsuccessful, and the captain
and two members of his crew were overrun
by the fire front and died from total body
second and third degree burns,
as well as inhalation of superheated air.
The third member of the crew ran back down the dozer line
toward Carrizo Canyon road.
The second battalion chief had enough time
to get safely back toward Carrizo Canyon road.
The Santa Barbara County dozer operator,
was overrun on the fire line about 200 yards
up from Carrizo Canyon road.
He was able to get off his dozer
and use it as a heat barrier when the fire front passed,
incurring only minor burns.
The third engine crew member was found at 16:20,
as he stumbled down the dozer line
to the location of the Santa Barbara County dozer.
He had suffered second and third degree burns
over 60% of his body.
This firefighter died 202 days after the accident.
The operator of dozer 5348, was unhurt.
After the flame front past, he started back down the line
and found the bodies of the captain and the two firefighters
from engine 5373.
These are the hard hats that were worn
by two of the firefighters involved in the burnover.
This is the Nomex shirt worn by the captain.
The weather event that played a part in this accident
was set up with strong westerly gradient winds.
During events such as this,
thermal vertically oriented air occurrence,
such as those found over mountainous terrain or on fires
can rise into the more stable,
but fast moving gradient winds aloft.
The ensuing mixing action may allow
the strong gradient winds to surface.
These winds surface for a short duration several times
during the fire.
Eye witnesses reported that the winds surfaced
for only 10 to 20 minutes.
One of these surfacing actions contributed to the accident.
You have just seen the events that occurred
on the Spanish Ranch Fire.
The instructor will now facilitate a discussion
about the use of fire safety guidelines
by the involved personnel.
The strategic and tactical decisions that were made,
and the human factors that contributed
to this burnover incident.
(ominous music)